n the past thirty years, the most fundamental change in higher education policies throughout the world has been the attempt to democratize access. Rapidly expanding primary and secondary school enrollments, increased demands for skilled labor, and the growing perception of higher education as
a path to individual prosperity fueled pressures to expand higher education opportunities. In developing countries in particular, the effect has been dramatic: higher education enrollments increased substantially in developing countries at all income levels. But government resources allocated to higher education did not keep pace with the expansion. In many instances, particularly during the 1980s, real resources actually contracted as many developing countries adopted structural adjustment programs that led to declining government budgets, which forced drastic reductions in government support for higher education. Table 1 reports public expenditures per student in 1975, 1980, and 1988 for countries for which data are available for all three years. Between 1975 and 1988 , public funding per student dropped in countries of all income categories; in all but the high-income countries, the decline was substantial.
Maintaining the quality of and ensuring needy students' access to higher education, while at the same time containing fiscal expenditures require that institutions either become more cost efficient or bring in more external funds. The students-the direct beneficiaries of higher education-are the most obvious source of additional funds. Furthermore, recovering at least part of the costs of higher education from students can be justified on efficiency and equity grounds (Psacharopoulos, Tan, and Jimenez 1986; Jimenez 1987) . To summarize these arguments: cost recovery is believed to lead to a more efficient use of public and private resources, to make educational systems that tend to attract elites more equitable, and to provide revenues to improve educational opportunities and quality. 335-$5,999 ; and high-income, $6,000 or more.
b. Because reliable data were available for only a few countries in Latin America and the Middle East, those regions are not analyzed separately.
Source: Authors' calculations from UNESCO data.
But recovering costs from students is often politically difficult and raises the problem of how to preserve educational opportunities for students who cannot afford to pay. A solution adopted by many countries is loans that defer payment for higher education until students graduate and begin to earn. Woodhall (1983 Woodhall ( , 1987a Woodhall ( , 1987b Woodhall ( , and 1991 has done extensive theoretical and comparative work on student loans and their potential role in developing countries. Johnstone (1986) has surveyed student support mechanisms in industrial countries. More theoretical discussions have been developed by Mingat, Tan, and Hoque (1985) and Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) . Recent work has focused on alternative loan formats, especially income-related repayment structures commonly known as income-contingent loans (Barnes and Barr 1988; Barr 1989; Woodhall 1989) . In addition to mobilizing private resources for higher education, government establishment of, or support for, student loan programs is economically justified on the basis of imperfections in capital markets. Private banks will not usually accept an intangible asset, such as human capital, as collateral on a loan. In addition, investments in human capital are inherently risky, because some students do not complete their studies, while others do not find employment after graduation. This is a risk to individual students but not to lenders making many student loans. It provides a rationale for payments by students based on future earnings, as will be argued subsequently. These risks are compounded because student loans often have medium-to long-term repayment periods, while many countries, particularly those with inflationary economies, do not have long-term debt markets. Finally, student loans are often unattractive to banks because their small individual size makes them costly to administer.
These considerations may be sufficient reason for governments to guarantee loans, as many do. However, they do not explain why governments commonly subsidize loans by offering students credit at below-market interest rates, particularly if government is trying to shift some of the costs of higher education to the students. Such subsidies have tended to benefit not the poor, but the relatively well off and politically powerful.
Although most studies have been optimistic about the effectiveness of student loans as a cost recovery instrument, few have actually examined the financial implications of loan programs. This article examines those effects, identifies some fundamental flaws in existing programs that impede their effectiveness in recovering costs, and discusses some possibilities for reform.
Existing Student Loan Programs
More than fifty countries have used various forms of student loan programs. The present study has identified twenty programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, eight in Asia, four in the Middle East and Northern Africa, seven in Sub-Saharan Africa, and fourteen in industrial countries (see table 2 ). The large number of loan programs in Latin America and the Caribbean is noteworthy. Colombia first implemented student loans in 1953 to assist graduate students studying overseas (Woodhall 1983) , and loan programs (referred to locally as student credit programs) are now in place in most countries in the region. In addition to the programs listed in the table, Guatemala has a loan program with limited coverage and the Caribbean Development Bank operates a student loan program for eleven small countries (Carlson 1992) . The great number of loan programs in the region contrasts with the paucity of such schemes in other developing countries, especially in the Middle East and Africa, where some loan plans have been abandoned in recent years. With only four exceptions, these programs offer students credit in the form of a traditional mortgage-type loan. Repayment is made over a specified period, usually in fixed monthly payments whose level depends upon interest rates and the maximum length of the repayment period. In contrast to this regime of equal nominal payments, most universities in Chile allow graduated nominal payments; borrowers from Chile's Catholic University repay in equal real (rather than nominal) installments, thus ensuring that early payments are not excessively large in real terms in relation to later payments.
A third type of repayment mechanism, used in Australia, Ghana, and Sweden, is an income-contingent loan in which a fixed proportion of a graduate's annual income is used to repay the loan. Income-contingent loans are expected to be more favorable than mortgage-type loans to low-income students. Because the future value of a degree is not known with certainty, the risk of borrowing for education is greatest for poor students whose future earnings potential may be lower than that of wealthier students. In addition, the poor are more risk averse than the well-to-do (Reuterberg and Svennson 1990; Barr 1989) . The fixed repayments of mortgage-type loans commit the debtor to repaying an open-ended proportion of his or her income, and may, therefore, deter borrowing among the very groups that the loans are intended to reach. Income-contingent loans provide for effective recovery of costs at minimum risk to the borrower. Because monthly repayments are linked to the graduate's income, income contingency limits debt burden in a given period and is therefore beneficial to lower-wage earners. These earners also benefit more from any subsidies built into the loans because they repay their loans more slowly than high-wage earners. One problem with income-contingent repayments is that, like any income-based tax, they may discourage earnings. Fixed loan repayment programs, which are akin to lump-sum taxes, do not discourage earnings.
Loan programs are usually administered by autonomous public lending institutions through revolving funds, which, once capitalized, are expected to finance themselves through repayments from earlier loans. This is rarely the outcome, however, because, as will be shown, loans are generally heavily subsidized and result in losses for the lending agency. The advantage of public lending institutions is that they can target loans to particular groups in line with government policy. Autonomous public lenders exist throughout Latin America, in Europe, and in Egypt and Nigeria, but institutional strength varies tremendously.
A second common administrative arrangement is the use of commercial banks, both publicly and privately owned. Some manage entire programs, while others act simply as collection agents. Banks tend to manage student loan programs more efficiently than do autonomous bodies. In fact, there are three good reasons to rely on the private sector to run student loan programs: the government does not have to make initial capital outlays; private sector efficiencies may reduce the costs of a loan program; and government does not have to create a potentially costly administrative apparatus to operate the program. When commercial banks are the lenders, governments usually guarantee the loans, fully or in part. In the United States, for example, private banks disburse and collect money from students, while the government guarantees and subsidizes the loans. In some countries, private banks have begun student loan programs without any government guarantees or subsidies. Lending, however, is usually limited to creditworthy borrowers (not poorer students) and to students in fields such as medicine or finance that promise high private returns to the investment. A program in Morocco, for example, supports private institutions that offer training in fields that lead to high-salaried employment. A program in Indonesia finances high tuition fees for elite business programs. Such programs signal universities to expand their programs in fields relevant to the labor market.
A third administrative approach, in place in Ghana and Australia, uses existing government revenue collection systems to recover loans. In Ghana borrowers repay through the social security system; their initial contributions to social security are actually used to repay their loans and the accumulation of retirement benefits is deferred until repayment is complete. In Australia borrowers repay through a graduated addition to their income tax rate of 2, 3, or 4 percent, depending on the borrower's income. In both countries, repayments are transferred to the budgets of the appropriate government bodies without creating new administrative structures. Although there may be little conceptual difference between a loan repaid through the taxation system and one repaid to a bank, repayment through the taxation system may be considerably more effective both in recovering funds and lowering administrative costs. In addition, if government structures are used, then the government usually needs to make the initial capital outlays for the program.
In most countries (particularly developing countries), tuition is free or set at nominal levels only; living costs, however, are high. Thus, numerous programs offer support for students' living expenses. Of the forty-three programs for which information is available, thirty-seven offered living expenses (for lodgings, food, and so on). Of these, nearly half (among them, European countries, Kenya, and Ghana) supported living expenses solely; the rest (including the United States, Colombia, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Japan), a combination of tuition and living expenses. Only six countries (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Morocco, Nigeria, and the Philippines) offered support for tuition alone.The programs supporting combined tuition and living expenses often attempt to promote student choice between public and private institutions. A student can use support either to pay tuition at more expensive private schools or to cover living costs at a public university where the tuition is lower (as in Colombia and the United States).
The purpose of the loan program in any country depends on the particular policies and structure of its university system. Student living allowances often absorb a very high proportion of the higher education budget. In Africa, for example, where public university education is typically free, generous student support often accounts for more than half of public monies allocated to higher education. In theory, loan programs that finance living expenses can therefore free up government budgets to finance other educational inputs. Many African governments with large student support budgets have either recently implemented loan programs, such as in Ghana and Malawi, or are contemplating such programs.
Loans for tuition, alone or in combination with living expenses, have often been essential to the development of fee-charging private institutions of higher education. In Colombia and Brazil loans to students attending private institutions have permitted these institutions to expand, thus increasing the overall access to higher education while lowering budgetary demands on the government. Australia combined new tuition fees with an option to pay the whole amount as a loan through the tax system. In Chile, large tuition increases were combined with student support programs managed by universities.
Both the amount that students receive and the number of students receiving loans influence the amount of total lending. In industrialized countries average annual loans typically range between $1,000 and $5,000 a year; in developing countries loans are much smaller. With the exception of countries that use loans to finance overseas study, programs in developing countries usually lend less than $500 per student. Those programs lending large amounts (Venezuela, Honduras, and Barbados) have extensive overseas programs. Barbados' lending is exceptionally high because the country does not have its own university and students rely almost exclusively on foreign training. Whereas between 20 and 80 percent of all students receive loans in industrialized countries, in developing countries coverage is almost always less than 10 percent of the student population. The exceptions are Kenya and Ghana, where all public university students receive loans for living expenses. High coverage usually indicates that loans replaced outright grants or the free provision of housing and food. Generally, in developing countries, the higher the coverage, the lower the average loan amount. When institutions lend to less than 1 percent of the student population, they are able to lend larger amounts; when coverage expands to 10 percent of the student population, the size of the average loan dwindles. The constraint on loan organizations in developing countries stems from their over-whelming dependence on the government for financial support: when student repayments are relatively insignificant, total support in a given year is determined by government allocations.
The Financial Impact
The main purpose of a loan program, unlike a grant program, is to require students to share the costs of tuition or living expenses or both with the government through payments from their future earnings. The financial efficacy of any loan program depends centrally on the extent to which the loans are repaid. The relationship between amounts lent to students and amounts returned in repayments is an indicator of the program's efficiency in achieving cost recovery; this is defined as the loan recovery ratio.
Because most developing country loan programs provide assistance for student living expenses and not for tuition, even if loan recovery were complete the vast majority of loan programs would only reduce government financing burdens for living expenses, and the problem of diversifying the resource base of higher education institutions would not be resolved. That is because tuition fees at most public institutions of higher education, where present, cover only a small proportion of the full costs of the education that students receive.
Therefore, the institutional cost recovery ratio-the average loan repayment in relation to unit costs-will be low, particularly in those countries where student loans cover living expenses only. Institutional cost recovery cannot be significant unless tuition fees reflect those costs and loans are used to pay tuition.
Loan Recovery
Recovering the costs of student loans depends on three issues: the amount of hidden interest subsidies on the loans; repayment losses due to default; and administrative costs. Student loans are subsidized if their interest rate is below the market rate. More precisely, even if loans are provided at market interest rates, for example, at rates comparable to those on consumer loans, they are still subsidized because loans for investment in education are inherently riskier than consumer loans. This subsidy is a hidden grant to students.
The authors have calculated the size of the hidden grant relative to the loan amount for twenty-three programs in twenty countries. 1 The calculations assume repayments are made in conformity with the formal conditions of the loan agreement. Thus, the amount and timing of scheduled repayment are compared to the amount of the loan disbursed. The real interest rate charged and the length of the repayment period influence the size of the subsidy. Table  3 lists the nominal interest rate charged, the real interest rate (the nominal rate adjusted for average inflation), and the length of the repayment period (excluding grace periods) for the twenty-three programs in the sample. In some in- Notes: The appendix contains a methodological note outlining the method used for calculating the hidden subsidy. A real opportunity cost of capital is used, according to the government rate of borrowing or estimates used by the World Bank. Loans are assumed to be paid out in equal installments over a four-year period, adjusted each year for inflation. Because of the unavailability of relevant data, the calculation for the Swedish income-conringent program is based on Australia's age earning profile information.
Column (1). "a" Denotes loan programs in four countries that underwent substantial reform. Data are given both for the pre-and post-reform programs.
Column (2). Nominal interest rate refers only to the rate during the repayment period. "b" refers to loans with different rates during the disbursement and grace period.
Column (3). Real interest rates use purchasing power parity formula, where inflation is based on the average of the 1980-88 period as reported in the World Bank's annual World Development Report except in those instances where a five-year average of inflation was calculated from the data date. "c" denotes those programs with indexed interest rates.
Column (4). The repayment length is the maximum prescribed in the loan, not including grace periods. For the two income-contingent plans, the repayment length is that implied by the average income profile of a graduate. Inflation is assumed to be constant throughout the life of the loan.
Column (6). "d" denotes estimates based on the percentage of loans in arrears.
stances, repayment length is a function of the number of years over which borrowing occurs; four years of borrowing is assumed. The length of repayment on income-contingent loans is estimated by using an average income profile for university graduates. The hidden subsidy to the student is expressed as a percentage of the original loan; this is calculated as the ratio of the net present value of the student's repayment to the present value of the loan disbursement. (See the appendix, which explains the methodology used for measuring the hidden subsidy, as well as the subsequent calculations used to assess the financial implications of student loan programs.) All of the loan programs in the sample are subsidized, with subsidies ranging from 13 percent of the loan amount in Barbados to 93 percent in Venezuela. In half of the programs examined, the subsidy exceeded 50 percent of the loan, indicating that less than half of the real loan value would be recovered if all students repaid on time. Even when real interest rates were positive-as in Barbados and Sweden-the loans were still subsidized because the interest charged was below market rates.
A concurrent study of loan programs in selected Latin American and Caribbean countries found broadly similar results for the two countries common to the two studies (Carlson 1992 ). Carlson calculated a "subsidization rate" based on the difference between the interest rates on student loans and those on commercial loans. His results yielded a subsidization rate of 33 percent in Colombia and 54 percent in Honduras, which do not significantly differ from the estimated hidden subsidy rate of 29 percent and 51 percent, respectively, in our calculations.
Because not all students meet their repayment obligations, the calculation of loan subsidies alone does not reflect the full costs of the loan program to the government. Experience with default has been mixed. In some instances, default and evasion add significantly to the cost of hidden subsidies. Nonrepayment of loans was as high as 81 percent in Kenya, for example, so that even with strict repayment terms, little revenue returned to the lender. In other countries, such as Sweden and Hong Kong, default was less of a problem. Default rates were lower in industrial countries, particularly smaller countries where borrowers were easy to track. It has yet to be demonstrated that default can be reduced in large developing countries without extensive administrative costs.
When default probabilities are factored into the lender's cost, measured losses from the loan program rise (table 3). In the original Jamaican program, in Chile, and in Kenya, defaults increased losses by ten, twenty-one, and twentyfour percentage points, respectively.
To establish the true cost of a deferred payment program, administrative costs must also be taken into account. Administrative costs include initial processing costs, maintenance costs, and collection costs. In developing countries the difficulty of tracking students can substantially increase administrative costs. The small average size of loans makes them proportionately more costly to process and maintain.
No detailed comparative study of administrative costs of loan programs has been conducted, and available data are mostly limited to industrial countries. Because of data limitations, the administrative costs of programs are usually evaluated using a measure of cost in relation to outstanding debt. The most efficiently run operations, in Sweden, Hong Kong, and Quebec, report administrative costs ranging between 0.5 and 1 percent of outstanding debt each year (Woodhall 1983; Woodhall 1990; Quebec Student Financial Assistance Program 1990) . In Latin America the cost of loan management overall has been estimated at 12 to 23 percent of the value of the loan (Woodhall 1983) . Annual reports from Latin American loan organizations confirm these estimates, and suggest that the loan recovery agencies are spending even more, as much as 30 percent in Honduras. World Bank data from Venezuela suggest that the overall administrative cost for the largest loan program varies between 13 and 16 percent of the loan value.
In calculating the net return of loan programs when administrative costs are unknown, we assume an annual cost of only 2 percent of outstanding debt each year. When discounted, this assumption implies an overall cost of approximately 10 percent of total loan value, which is likely to understate the actual administrative costs of a loan program. Loan programs that rely on commercial banks or use taxation departments for collection have been less costly to administer. In Brazil, according to World Bank data, operating costs for the commercial banks are approximately 10 percent of the total loan value (World Bank data). Administrative costs for collection through the tax system may be even smaller due to large economies of scale.
Given the low assumed value of administrative costs, the overall losses in table 3 are conservative estimates; the true net loss to government is likely to be greater. The most efficient programs are in Sweden and Barbados, which both recover 67 percent of the loans' value, while the programs in Venezuela and Kenya may actually cost more than would outright grants to students, depending, of course, on the cost of administering student grants. Carlson's (1992) study of loan recovery in selected programs in Latin America produced similar results (except for Chile). Taking account of loan repayments, default, and administrative costs, Carlson estimated the overall loan recovery rate at 34 percent for Brazil, 52 percent for both Chile and Colombia, 27 percent for Honduras, and 30 percent for Jamaica. The comparable loan recovery rates from the current study are 29 percent for Brazil, 18 percent for Chile, 53 percent for Colombia, 28 percent for Honduras, and 30 percent for Jamaica.
Cost Recovery
One of the central theoretical and practical rationales for loan programs is to broaden sources of funding for higher education. As noted, however, most loans are used not to finance tuition fees, but to limit government expenditures on student living expenses. Figure 1 illustrates the experience of seven countries in which loan programs explicitly support student payment of fees in public universities and thus are an instrument of cost recovery. The student contribution via direct fees and the present value equivalent of payments via student loans are shown as percentages of unit instructional costs. It is assumed that students receive a loan equivalent in size to tuition fees. In these seven countries, with some of the highest public sector cost recovery rates in the world, governments recover on a present value basis the equivalent of only between 2 percent (Colombia) and 14 percent (Quebec) of instructional costs from loan recipients. The problem is perhaps most severe in Chile where tuition fees in formerly public institutions cover more of the unit instructional costs-60 percent-than they do anywhere else in the world (Schiefelbein 1990 ). Because of losses on loans, mostly due to nonpayment, the net cost recovery from students who receive loans is only 11 percent. Thus their efforts to diversify their revenue sources are undermined.
In Australia the government recovers, on average, 43 percent of the loan value if the student pays for tuition via an income-contingent loan. Students who pay their fees directly are given a 15 percent discount, in recognition of the hidden subsidy on the loan. This discount, however, is well below the loan subsidy, as calculated for average income earners. The effective cost recovery is only 9 percent of unit costs. (Since these calculations were made, the Aus-tralian government increased the percentage of income that students must repay each year, thus reducing the subsidy.)
Overall, effective cost recovery is extremely low because tuition and other student fees generally do not represent significant portions of the costs of higher education and because loan recovery ratios are themselves low. If loans are to be used for cost recovery, significant fee levels must be established, and loan recovery rates must improve. To date, loans have operated only at the margins of cost recovery.
Taxing Graduates
Traditional mortgage-type loans and income-contingent loans are not the only deferred payment options available. A more radical approach for recovering costs, which might be particularly relevant for those countries considering the introduction of a student loan program, is a tax on graduates.
The idea behind a graduate tax is straightforward. By subsidizing higher education, the government is in effect financing the creation of human capital. This produces a future stream of benefits that accrues mainly to graduates in the form of higher earnings. Because of its investment in the graduates' education, the government essentially acquires an equity share in the human capital created and is thus entitled to a dividend from the ensuing income benefits. In the case of a graduate tax, this dividend takes the form of a percentage tax on graduates' income over their working lives. The term graduate tax is somewhat misleading because the tax legitimately applies also to individuals who attend institutions of higher education but fail to graduate. The tax is a type of user fee, and therefore could accumulate for each year that the student attends a university. The graduate tax rate could also vary with income level, with low-income graduates exempted from the tax. Thus, the government assumes some of the risks of investing in human capital but spreads these risks over the student cohort; high-earning graduates will prove to have been good investments, graduates with low incomes or high unemployment, poor investments.
The graduate tax described here resembles the income-contingent loan program recently introduced in Australia (where it has been labeled a graduate tax). But despite the resemblance and the label, the two schemes are in fact quite different. In the Australian program income-related loan repayments are made through the income tax system, but this is done for administrative convenience only. In principle, other collection institutions could be used, though there are clear advantages in using the taxation system. The motivation behind both loan and equity finance schemes is, ultimately, cost recovery, with the beneficiaries of higher education forgoing part of the return on higher education. In the case of loans, the government and graduates have a creditor-borrower relationship, which terminates when the original loan has been repaid, as defined in the loan agreement. In the case of a graduate tax, the government can be considered to have an equity holding, entitling the government to a share in the benefits of higher education, which are paid as a percentage of the graduates' income over their working lives.
How effective are graduate taxes in recovering the costs of higher education? In order to illustrate the impact of a graduate tax, the Australian loan program is simulated as if it were a graduate tax in which students are assessed 2 percent of their income per year. 2 The results are compared with a traditional loan repayment and an income-contingent loan program whose repayments are also set at 2 percent of income. The comparisons are based only on repayments and do not include likely losses to nonpayment and administrative costs. It is assumed that the graduate tax is collected for thirty years, rather than over the whole working life, that income-contingent loan repayments are made over seventeen years, and that mortgage loans are repaid over fifteen years. A discount rate of 5 percent is used, the loan amount is A$2,500 over three years, the interest rate is equal to inflation, and the grace period before any of the payments start is two years.
The present value of loan repayments is A$4,270 for the mortgage-type loan and A$3,696 for the income-contingent loan. The difference stems principally from a shorter repayment period and higher initial payments for the mortgagetype loan. The lower present value on repayments on income-contingent loans may be offset in practice, however, by lower rates of default. But the present value of the graduate tax is A$5,138, a sum significantly greater than either of the two loan formats. Whereas an income-contingent loan plan recovers only 9 percent of total costs of education (figure 1), a graduate tax would result in roughly full recovery of the equivalent loan, which covers some 20 percent of unit instructional costs, though this may not accrue to higher education. Within twenty years (assuming that the student cohort grows 3 percent a year), a 2 percent graduate tax would generate about 15 percent of the total university costs in Australia.
The chief justification for the graduate tax, or equity finance approach, is that it can generate more revenue than do loan programs. Since payment of a graduate tax is linked to future earnings and not educational costs, tax payments can in theory be extracted long after a loan would have been paid off. Moreover, as graduates age and their salaries increase, revenues from the graduate tax increase, even without a rate increase. Yet this gives rise to the criticism that graduate taxes are front-loaded; that is, the government pays out money immediately and receives the return much later when the stock of tax-paying graduates accumulates. (Mortgage loans are also front-loaded, but the repayment period is faster.) This criticism may be overstated, because, in principle, the government may borrow against these outlays just as it would if it ran a student loan program.
Moving Forward
This article has concentrated on the financial implications of loan programs, but issues of equity must also be considered. Despite the lack of empirical work on how loans affect access to higher education in developing countries, it is clear that making students pay more of the costs of their education will discourage some individuals who otherwise would have pursued higher education. This does not necessarily hurt equity. Most higher education systems in developing countries are not very equitable to begin with; access tends to be skewed toward higher income groups, where children attend better primary and secondary schools and families can afford to have their children out of work for longer periods. Individuals in lower-income groups often lack meaningful access to educational opportunities, regardless of student loan programs. As currently designed, these programs bestow large subsidies on the wealthier groups. Increases in cost-recovery ratios will reduce access for lower-income groups but, by economizing on outlays for higher education, will also allow the government to improve access to primary and secondary education and to provide grants to the poorest. The central equity concern should be to design a deferred payment program that minimizes any reduction in access.
Loan programs can be expensive enterprises that do not easily satisfy the need for cost recovery. The following list of issues can serve as a guide in deciding whether to implement a deferred payment program.
First, a deferred payment program requires the participation of a credible collection institution with incentives to collect. In most instances commercial banks, a taxation department, or a social security agency will be the best choice. The likely default rate on a loan program can be assessed by examining the current tax evasion rate among graduates, the proportion of self-employed graduates, and the current rate of graduate unemployment. If default or evasion is likely to be greater than, say 25 percent, it would be inadvisable to implement a loan program; in such cases, a carefully targeted grant program is likely to be more cost-effective.
Second, interest rates on loans must be equal to or above the inflation rate in order to reduce subsidies. With tax or income-contingent collection, the rate assessed must be sufficient to ensure significant cash flows. Careful financial calculations must be conducted that account for the likely effect of inflationparticularly on the size of annual disbursements-and growth of the higher education system. From this information, one can assess whether the program will generate significant income for the higher education system. Third, the relationship between necessary payments and the likely incomes of graduates should be examined to ensure that repayment never imposes an excessive burden on graduates. Just as a private bank examines repayment burdens in relation to an individual's earnings, student loan repayments should not exceed a certain (albeit unspecified) proportion of a graduate's likely income. Excessive burdens only result in higher default. Average income profiles of graduates are not sufficient for calculating repayment burdens. The income range according to profession and economic sector should be used in program design.
Fourth, targeting support to needier and more academically deserving students will be crucial to a program's efficiency. In developing countries, good targeting requires access to information on need and ability. The universities themselves and other agencies that deal directly with the students often have access to this information.
Fifth, loan losses can only be justified if there are potential social gains that would not be reflected in a graduate's income. Subsidies can promote, indirectly, private institutional development and direct students into teaching, rural development work, or private sector entrepreneurship, by forgiving loans. If these are desirable goals, one can consider whether a student loan program is an efficient way of attaining them.
The annual cash flow to the government is as follows: -D for the four years of loan disbursements, 0 during the grace period, and P during the repayment period.
The present value of disbursements is The subsidy to the student in currency units is PVdisb -PVrepay. As a percentage of the loan value, it 's (PVdisb -PVrepay) / PVdisb
Calculating the Loss to the Government, Including Default
The calculations are the same as above, except that payment amounts are reduced to account for the probability that they are not made. Thus, the annual payments are Pdef = P(1-d), where d is the probability of default in any year.
Calculating the Total Loss to the Government, Including Default and Administrative Costs
Each year of the cash stream is adjusted to reflect the cost of administering the loans, which is calculated as the annual percentage cost of servicing outstanding debt. Let od = outstanding debt on the loan; ac = administrative cost of servicing the loan, as a percentage of outstanding debt each year; t = year in the life of the loan; cf = cash flow calculated above, including the likelihood of default; and CF = adjusted cash flow, including the likelihood of default and administrative costs.
In each year, the cash flow is adjusted as follows:
CFt = cft-[ (odt) (ac)].
and the present values and subsidies are calculated as they were for the student subsidy.
Notes
Douglas Albrecht was formerly a consultant in the Education and Employment Division of the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department and is now at Harvard University. Adrian Ziderman, formerly senior economist in the division, is professor of economics at the Bar Ilan University, Israel. The article presents results from a World Bank research program on policies for financing universities in developing countries, directed by Adrian Ziderman. Full results will appear in book form; a preliminary version is presented in Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) .
1. Programs were evaluated using simulation models for mortgage-type loans (including tilted payment schemes), income-contingent loans, and graduate taxes. These models allow flexible repayment streams and costs and can project budgetary requirements. For information on their use, contact the authors.
2. Technically, a graduate tax should be charged only on the income enhanced by human capital investment in university education (that is, on income earned over the average received by those with university entry qualifications). For administrative efficiency a lower average rate, levied on all income is assumed, rather than a higher marginal rate only on the graduate earnings differential.
